We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions andbidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has asubstantial …

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest … bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two …-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which motivates to study symmetric NEs: Properties and comparative statics are …

divestitures. The Dutch government has doneexactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for highway …

We study auctions in which the number of potential bidders is large, such as in Internet auctions. With numerous … bidders, the expected revenue and the optimal bid function in a first price auction result in complicated expressions, except … Internet auctions. …

firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market prof-its are uncertain so that winning an auction is like winning a … lottery ticket.li one license is auctioned, auctions select the firm that is least risk averse.This is what we call the risk …

If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a … laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English … auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly reject our theoretical prediction that the English auction leads to less …

This paper considers a government auctioning off multiple licenses to firms who compete in a market after the auction …. Firms have different costs, and cost efficiency is private information at the auction stage and the market competition stage …. If only one license is auctioned, standard results say that the most efficient firm wins the auction (license) as it will …

We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while …