to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized … information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe …

cartels, including revenue-based penalties, the most widely used regime. We showed that for a typical industry overcharge …

to screen industries that traditionally apply delivered pricing for the presence of cartels. We operationalize this … screen with a software. The test is hard to beat for cartels using this otherwise elusive form of price-fixing. When a cartel …

others creating socially suboptimal outcomes. We investigate if and how communication mitigates the strategic delay in … introducing communication into this setting reduces strategic delay. We implement our model in a laboratory experiment utilizing a … 2x2 design, where we vary the availability of communication and the number of agents. We find that communication …

asymmetries have on bargaining power, especially when the asymmetries relate to recognition probabilities. …This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and … recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the …

This paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement activities by a … Competition Authority (CA). We distinguish three sets of interventions: (a) detecting, prosecuting and penalizing cartels; (b … to prevent the re-emergence of prosecuted cartels in the longer term. The last two intervention activities have not been …