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, which raises efficiency and seller's revenues. Efficiency and revenues are also higher when more bidders enter the auction. …
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This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382752
We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions andbidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has asubstantial …
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This paper provides a structural empirical analysis of Dutch auctions of houseplants at the flower auction in Aalsmeer … auction participants, and as such these data are collectible due to neurological constraints on information processing. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372506
-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which motivates to study symmetric NEs: Properties and comparative statics are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374396
constrained bidders. Succeedingly we propose an ascending auction mechanism that always results in an equilibrium allocation and … underdemanded set, or there is neither overdemand nor underdemand anymore. In the latter case the auction stops. In the former case …, precisely one item will be sold, the bidder buying the item leaves the auction and the auction continues with the remaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374424
Internet auctions attract numerous agents, but only a few become active bidders. A major difficulty in the structural analysis of internet auctions is that the number of potential bidders is unknown. Under the independent private value paradigm (IPVP)the valuations of the active bidders form a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374431