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coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
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A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
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.Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a correspondingcooperative … nonemptiness of the core of project games. …
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of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …
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