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This paper investigates the optimal design of incentives when agents distort probabilities. We show that the type of …, the strength of the incentives included in the optimal contract, and the location of incentives on the output space. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013460007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003813782
Incentives based on esteem, honor and shame are increasingly popular and easy to use due to modern surveillance … Tirole (2011) to explore the effect of esteem-based incentives and their interaction with traditional monetary incentives. We … show that esteem-based incentives can indeed lead to a loss of control by generating multiple equilibria, some of which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844573
In many workplaces co-workers have the best information about each other's effort. Managers may attempt to exploit this information through peer evaluation. I study peer evaluation in a pure moral hazard model of production by two limitedly liable agents. Agents receive a signal about their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380732
performance of the treatment stores. As predicted by theory, treatment stores that lag far behind do not respond to the incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382591
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722629
This paper studies how firms can efficiently incentivize supervisors to truthfully report employee performance. To this end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the agent, which is observable to the agent but not to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226565
When verifiable performance measures are imperfect, organizations often resort to subjective performance pay. This may give supervisors the power to direct employees towards tasks that mainly benefit the supervisor rather than the organization. We cast a principal-supervisor-agent model in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395075
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479787
In a centralized marketplace that was designed to be simple, we identify participants whose choices are dominated. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that college applicants make obvious mistakes: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver worth thousands of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011772987