We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behavior to an outside observer. We consider two … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …

farm auctions and evaluates the impact of price guarantees and subsidies on auction efficiency, government revenue, and … experiment suggests that the price guarantee improves efficiency and that it often increases production and revenue. An important … guarantee, and hence with more uncertainty in the auction, this increases the chances that risk-loving bidders win the auction …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions andbidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has asubstantial …

. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially …

-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …

as equilibrium phenomena of the ascending auction. In a series of experiments, we compare its performance to that of the … discriminatory auction. Strategic demand reduction is quite prevalent in the ascending auction even when entry by the newcomer … imposes a (large) negative externality on incumbents. As a result, the ascending auction performs worse than the …

laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English … auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly reject our theoretical prediction that the English auction leads to less … aggressive bids and fewer bankruptcies than the first-price sealed-bid auction. X-cursedness gives a robust explanation of our …

In a door-to-door fundraising field experiment, we study the impact of fundraising mechanisms on charitable giving. We … approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary … contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households competed for a prize in the all-pay auction …