In procurement auctions, bidders are usually better informed about technical, financial, or legal aspects of the goods … and services procured. Therefore, the buyer may include a dialogue in the procurement procedure which enables the … and in a laboratory experiment. Our theoretical results suggest that in a setting where the buyer and the suppliers have …

. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non …-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …

Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector …

-binding price requests. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition moderates the way such cheap-talk communication … granularity effects of cheap-talk communication on negotiation outcomes. Our results show that most of these effects survive with …

Aftermarket social welfare is largely determined by a procurement auction design. Auctions select firms for operating … aftermarket social welfare generated by first-price and second-price procurement auctions. It reveals that the social welfare …-price procurement auctions are welfare-equivalent. When it increases (or decreases) with price, first-price (or second-price) auctions …

laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behavior to an outside observer. We consider two …

the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition …