how communication mitigates this free-riding problem in an investment-timing game. In our baseline investment-timing game … investor of the group bears the costs of investment while everyone in the group benefits if the project reveals high returns … communicate before choosing the investment time. We find that in groups of two players, communication increases cooperation and …

investment timings. Players choose when to invest in a nonrival project with uncertain returns. The earliest investor bears the … costs of investment and all players learn whether the project is of good or bad quality. Informational externalities create … free-riding incentives resulting in strategic delays in investment timings. Our theoretical analysis suggests that …

We analyze communication about the social returns to investment in a public good. We model two agents who have private … generates an incentive for "alarmism", the exaggeration of social returns in order to opportunistically induce more investment …

-down" model of executive optimization. Others, like salience theory, assume a "bottom-up" influence where attention is driven by … aversion. We discuss the insights regarding the nature of attention and its role in economic theory. …

In this paper we perform a meta-analysis on empirical estimates of the impact between investment and uncertainty. Since … investment research. For example, not including factor prices in investment models may seriously affect the model outco! mes … can explain to a large extent why empirical estimates of the investment-uncertainty relationship differ. …