Showing 1 - 10 of 553
In economic environments, decision-makers can strategically delay irreversible investments to learn from the actions of others. This creates free-riding incentives and can lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. We experimentally examine if and how communication mitigates this free-riding problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299600
Many everyday activities are habitual. Among the most common human activities is communication. If people primarily communicate in a common-interests environment, they may form habits of truth-telling and believing messages. If they primarily communicate in a conflicting-interests environment,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012887895
In economic environments, decision-makers may strategically delay irreversible investments to learn from the actions of others creating socially suboptimal outcomes. We investigate if and how communication mitigates the strategic delay in investment timings. Players choose when to invest in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013375345
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386160
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113
We analyze communication about the social returns to investment in a public good. We model two agents who have private information about these returns as well as their own taste for cooperation, or social preferences. Before deciding to contribute or not, each agent submits an unverifiable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011801387
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383193
We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477108
We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some … players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they … may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment in order to set incentives for others to join. We find that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011924829
coalition to coordinate provision. Compared with games with only goods (or only bads) we find larger coalitions in equilibrium …. Specifically, we analyze a game with quadratic benefit- and cost functions and we find the grand coalition to be stable except for … situations where agents have identical or almost identical characteristics. The main driving force of coalition stability is that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014380761