)The coalition decision, (ii) proposers' demand behavior in 2- and 3-personultimatum subgames, and (iii) theresponders' behavior in …

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …

We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some … players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they … may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment in order to set incentives for others to join. We find that the …

coalition to coordinate provision. Compared with games with only goods (or only bads) we find larger coalitions in equilibrium …. Specifically, we analyze a game with quadratic benefit- and cost functions and we find the grand coalition to be stable except for … situations where agents have identical or almost identical characteristics. The main driving force of coalition stability is that …

character. The grand coalition was always the efficientcoalition,whereas the values of the 2-personcoalitions are varied such … that they lead to an efficiency loss inthe range of6.7 up to 30 percent. Furthermore, the 2-person coalition implies social … huge majority of proposers choosethe inefficient and unfair 2-person coalition. Proposer inducedefficiencylosses vary …

players in the game.In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the playersare organized into an a priori coalition … payoff is equal to its share in someinternal game within its coalition multiplied by the share of thiscoalition in an … properties. Weprovide axiomatizations of this class of coalition structure sharefunctions using these consistency and …