This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using thefact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are...

We present a strategic game of pricing and targeted-advertising. Firms cansimultaneously target priceadvertisements to different groups of customers, or to the entiremarket. Pure strategy equilibria do not exist and thus marketsegmentation cannot occur surely. Equilibria exhibit random...

The term structure of interest rates does not adhere to the expectations hypothesis, possibly due to a risk premium. We consider the implications of a risk premium that arises from endogenous market segmentation driven by variable inflation rates. In the absence of autocorrelation in inflation,...

This paper argues that the introduction of a short-sale constraint in the Arrow-Radner frameworkinvalidates standard definitions of complete and incomplete markets. In this constrained set-up,two threshold values with familiar properties arise.The case of a zero short-sale bound set on some...

Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse frms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic frms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the...