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Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350369
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338011
We use project-level information for the largest regional economic development program in German history to study whether government subsidies to firms affect quantity and quality of bank lending. We combine recipient firms under the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures program (GRW) with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013413540
crowdfunding. Respondents evaluate a realistic investment opportunity in a between-subjects design, where we decompose the effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011720322
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374399
While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348359
We highlight the ex ante risk-shifting incentives faced by a bank's shareholders/managers when CoCos (contingent convertible capital) are part of the capital structure. The risk shifting incentive arises from the wealth transfers that the shareholders will receive upon the CoCo's conversion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441586
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191011
the issuing bank and their implications for risk taking and investment incentives. Finally, we use our model to explain …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011818282
We study entrepreneurs’ behavioral responses of effort (moral hazard) to avoid business failure.This is done in the context of an unemployment insurance scheme for self-employed, wherewe estimate how much of the transition probability to unemployment can be causally attributedto being insured....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376618