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Can communication mitigate strategic delays in investment timing?
Mermer, Ayse; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2022
investment timings. Players choose when to invest in a nonrival project with uncertain returns. The earliest investor bears the … costs of investment and all players learn whether the project is of good or bad quality. Informational externalities create … free-riding incentives resulting in strategic delays in investment timings. Our theoretical analysis suggests that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013375345
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Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems
Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, … - 2014
In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373726
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Bargaining in the presence of condorcet cycles : the role of asymmetries
Kamm, Aaron; Houba, Harold - 2015
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532580
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Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2016
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479787
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On the foundations of competitive search equilibrium with and without market makers
Albrecht, James W.; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; … - 2021
The literature offers two foundations for competitive search equilibrium, a Nash approach and a market-maker approach. When each buyer visits only one seller (or each worker makes only one job application), the two approaches are equivalent. However, when each buyer visits multiple sellers, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591528
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Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power
Albrecht, James W.; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; … - 2019
We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by its candidate. When the contract space...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057140
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Spatial search
Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2024
when locations are similar (in which case the aggregate matching function is urn-ball) but that quality weighted trade can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496539
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Competitive search with private information : can price signal quality?
Albrecht, James W.; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; … - 2024
This paper considers competitive search equilibrium in a market for a good whose quality differs across sellers. Each seller knows the quality of the good that he or she is offering for sale, but buyers cannot observe quality directly. We thus have a "market for lemons" with competitive search...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053938
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Equilibrium directed search with multiple applications
Albrecht, James W.; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan B. - 2005
We analyse a model of equilibrium directed search in a large labour market. Each worker, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, makes a fixed, finite number of applications, a. We allow for the possibility of ex post competition should more than one vacancy want to hire the same worker....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011332815
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Matching with multiple applications
Albrecht, James W.; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan B. - 2001
We analyze the implications of multiple applications by job seekers for the microfoundations of the matching function …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317448