Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 2,605
Cover Image
The political economy of financial systems
Haber, Stephen H.; Perotti, Enrico C. - 2008
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374399
Cover Image
Investor protection and entry
Perotti, Enrico C.; Volpin, Paolo - 2006
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350369
Cover Image
The political origin of pension funding
Perotti, Enrico C.; Schwienbacher, Armin - 2006 - Date: 20 December 2006
The paper seeks to explain the huge cross country variation in private pension funding,shaped by historical choice made when universal pension systems were created after theGreat Depression. According to Perotti and von Thadden (2006), large inflationaryshocks due to war damage devastated middle...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350371
Cover Image
Lobbying on entry
Perotti, Enrico C.; Volpin, Paolo - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338011
Cover Image
The political economy of financial fragility
Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico C. - 2005
While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348359
Cover Image
Go public or stay private : a theory of entrepreneurial choice
Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Gopalan, Radhakrishnan; Thakor, Anjan V. - 2003
In this paper we analyze an entrepreneur /manager's choice between private and public ownership in a setting in which management needs some elbow room or autonomy to optimally manage the firm. In public capital markets, the corporate governance regime in place exposes the firm to exogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334339
Cover Image
The political economy of corporate control
Perotti, Enrico C.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - 2005
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporategovernance structure and the return to human and financial capital.We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently diffused, thereis political support for a strong governance role for dispersed equitymarket investors, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346462
Cover Image
The political economy of dominant investors
Perotti, Enrico C.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - 2005
We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337975
Cover Image
The economic value of flexibility when there is disagreement
Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Thakor, Anjan V. - 2002
We develop an economic theory of “flexibility”, which we interpret as the discretion orability to make a decision that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011332819
Cover Image
Disagreement and flexibility : a theory of optimal security issuance and capital structure
Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Thakor, Anjan V. - 2002
ofthis theory of capital structure evolution is that optimal capital structure is essentiallydynamic, and depends on the firm …’s stock price, implying that firms issue equity when stockprices are high and debt when stock prices are low. The theory … testablepredictions. Moreover, the theory can rationalize the use of debt in the absence of taxes,agency costs or signaling considerations. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011332820