Showing 1 - 10 of 2,498
Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349199
On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453242
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001792605
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949
We experimentally investigate how price expectations are formed in a large asset market where subjects' only task is to forecast the future price of a risky asset. The realized prices depend on these expectations. We observe small (6 participants) and large markets (about 100 participants). In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011979625
. Third, and most importantly, making shareholders the ultimate owner of the firm provides the best possible diversification …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373820
Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labor rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334863
We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337975
This paper uses a unified treatment of real options and game theory to examine value appropriation in takeovers within …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337396
We analyze the dynamics of takeover contests where hostile raiders compete against white knights involved by a lead blockholder of the target firm (the incumbent). We assume that the incumbent has the power to bargain with the potential bidders to set a minimum takeover price. We characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377390