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This paper studies intertemporal social preferences. We introduce intertemporal dictator and ultimatum games where players decide on the timing of monetary payoffs. The setting is twodimensional rather than one-dimensional, in the sense that inequalities can arise in the time as well as in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013162492
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381991
of ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it … lies in the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We … prove that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core.We conclude by some examples showing the usefulness of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303860
This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342576
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the L|N |/2-̦core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224779
This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376297
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376532
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377258
nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378242
Harsanyi set is related to the Core and Weberset. We also characterize the Harsanyi mapping as the unique mappingsatisfying a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011313932