We examine the role of political factors in Mexico’s antidumping regime, considering both the characteristics of target countries subject to antidumping duties and industry-specific factors for sectors receiving protection. Our results are broadly consistent with the recent theoretical...

Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines likeOECD industrial tariff bindings negotiated under GATT since 1947 and new Uruguay Roundbindings on agricultural and services trade and on developing country industrial tariffs, constrain...

We explore the relationship between import protection and the household distribution of income. We first develop a general-equilibrium mapping from tariffs to household inequality measures. This also yields predictions for linkages between tariffs, development level, and observed household...

Anti-dumping actions are now the trade policy of choice of developing and transition economies. To understand why these economies have increasingly applied anti-dumping laws, we build a simple theoretical model of vertical intra-industry trade and investigate the strategic incentives of...

We study the optimal trade policy against a foreign oligopoly withendogenous quality. We show that, under the Most Favoured Nation(MFN) clause, a uniform tariff policy is always welfare improvingover the free trade equilibrium. However, a nonuniform tariff policyis always desirable on welfare...

This paper addresses the interplay between unilateralism and multilateralism. I first describe theirrespective stylized facts. I next present a simple, multi-country model with high initial tariffbarriers and with the features that have always been of paramount concern to policymakers,...