coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river …

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …

We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some … players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they … may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment in order to set incentives for others to join. We find that the …

coalition to coordinate provision. Compared with games with only goods (or only bads) we find larger coalitions in equilibrium …. Specifically, we analyze a game with quadratic benefit- and cost functions and we find the grand coalition to be stable except for … situations where agents have identical or almost identical characteristics. The main driving force of coalition stability is that …

antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics … including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program …

We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to … collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis … disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation, leniency, and cartel strategies. Without rewards to the strictly …