We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that...

We take a decentralized approach to regulating environmental pollution in settings where each agent's pollution possibly affects all others. There is no central agency to enforce pollution abatement or coordinate monetary transfers. Moreover, agents possess private information, which precludes...

We study the effects of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) on employment and profits as well as on the investment decisions of Dutch manufacturing firms. Motivated both by sizable differences between firms that are regulated in different phases and by the gradual increase in regulatory...

This paper empirically studies how emission pricing affects capital replacement and adoption of embodied environmental technology. A pricing policy encourages firms to accelerate retirement of old capital assets and replace them with newer more efficient assets, but this may crowd out...

We empirically investigate the responsiveness of international trade to the stringency of environmental regulation. Stringent environmental regulation may impair the export competitiveness of ‘dirty’ domestic industries, and as a result, ‘pollution havens’ emerge in countries where...