has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms …) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on the amount of water consumed by the agent. An allocation of the …

game theory to assess the economics of transboundary river water allocation in a simple model of river sharing. This model …We survey the economics of transboundary river water allocation, which emerged in the 1960s and has matured over the … attention to the strategic aspects of transboundary river water allocation. These strategic aspects are captured by employing …

In a river claims problem, agents are ordered linearly, and they have both an initial water endowment as well as a … properties which have particularly relevant interpretations for the river claims problem. Specifically, these properties relate … to situations where river flow is uncertain or highly variable, possibly due to climate change impacts. The only solution …

generated. However, when the river passes through several different countries or regions, a relevant question is how should the … costs be shared among the agents. Ni and Wang (2007) first consider this problem as cost sharing problems on a river network …, shortly called polluted river problems. They consider rivers with one spring which was generalized by Dong, Ni, and Wang (2012 …

Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow … agreements.To derive our main results we apply the Folk Theorem to the river sharing problem using the equilibrium concepts of …

This paper studies the relation between optimal dam capacity and water management under rivalry uses and externalities …-linear building cost of dam capacity and externalities in a welfare optimization model. We obtain the optimal dam capacity for multi …

coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river …We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using … cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not …

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …