We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are … we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the maximal cartel price, the largest price for which the … conditions for sustainability hold. We analyze how the maximal cartel price supported by different cartel strategies adjusts in …

significantly decreased cartel activity. The design of these repeated game experiments however is such that engaging in illegal …

antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics … including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program …

We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to … collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis … disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation, leniency, and cartel strategies. Without rewards to the strictly …

cartel formation, cartel stability and cartel recidivism. The program leads to lower prices for three reasons. First, non …-cooperators are more persistent in their behavior which effectively blocks cartel formation in their respective groups. Second …, members of groups that do form a cartel defect more often thus reducing the average cartel lifetime. Third, the difference …

screen with a software. The test is hard to beat for cartels using this otherwise elusive form of price-fixing. When a cartel …

considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy considerations limit maximum fines, ensure abnormal cartel profits and impose a … lower price by making it more attractive than collusion on higher prices. For a range of low cartel prices, the fine is set … to the legal mi nimum. Raising minimum fines will enable the cartel to raise its price and is better avoided. Our …

actual cartel effects. In this paper, we show that misdating cartel effects leads to a (weak) overestimation of but … antitrust damage estimation based on predicted cartel prices can have either sign. We extend the before-during-and-after method … with an empirical cartel dating procedure that uses multiple structural break tests to determine the actual begin and end …