We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of...

We argue that the prospect of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default reduces shareholder-debtholder conflicts and induces leveraged firms to invest more and take on less risk as they approach financial distress. To test these predictions, we use a large panel of firms in 41...

We model the financing, cash holdings, and hedging policies of a firm facing financing frictions and subject to permanent and transitory cash flow shocks. We show that permanent and transitory shocks generate distinct, sometimes opposite, effects on corporate policies and use the model to...

We model the joint effects of debt maturity and cash holdings on default risk. When firms have short-term debt outstanding, negative cash flow shocks lead to a drop in liquid reserves and may cause firms to suffer losses when rolling over their debt, due to weaker fundamentals. This mechanism...

We develop a dynamic model of banking to assess the effects of liquidity and leverage requirements on banks' insolvency risk. In this model, banks face taxation, flotation costs of securities, and default costs and maximize shareholder value by making their financing, liquid asset holdings, and...

We use a dynamic model of financing decisions to measure agency conflicts for a large panel of 12,652 firms from 14 countries. Our estimates show that agency conflicts are large and vary significantly across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in...