In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a fraction of the average wage level. In most countries, however, unemployment benefits are instead tied to the previous level of individually earned wages. We show how the analysis has to be...

We examine wage-bargaining in a two-sector economy when employers and labor unions in each sector are not always aware of all general equilibrium feedback effects. We show analytically that if agents only consider labor demand effects, low real wages and low unemployment result. With an...

This paper explicitly differentiates between unemployment and inactivity, by defining inactivity as a state in which individuals do not search for jobs when non-employed. Facing changes in the value of inactivity, individuals transit through three labor market states. In steady-state, we hence...

We investigate the role of spatial frictions in search equilibrium unemployment. For that, we develop a model of the labor market in which workers' location in an agglomeration depends on commuting costs, the endogenous price of land and the value of job search and employment. We first show that...

This paper develops a model that shows why high-skilled workers move more and are therefore unemployed less than low-skilled workers. The model can explain the paradoxical empirical regularity that higher owner-occupation rates are associated with higher levels of unemployment although...

Many European labor markets are characterized by heavy employment protection taxes and the widespread use of fixed-duration contracts. The simultaneous use of these two policy instruments seems somewhat contradictory since the former primarily aims at limiting job destruction whereas the latter...