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The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services
Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2009
, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … as the main cause and design a parsimonious experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294825
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The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294835
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The impact of distributional preferences on (experimental) markets for expert services
Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2009
, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … as the main cause and design a parsimonious experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as either … institutional design and agent selection in credence goods markets. -- Distributional preferences ; credence goods ; verifiability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003931304
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Reputation vs selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries
Alysandratos, Theodore; Geōrganas, Sōtērēs; Sutter, … - 2022
In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013448173
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Reputation vs selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries
Alysandratos, Theodore; Geōrganas, Sōtērēs; Sutter, … - 2022
In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013468203
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The economics of credence goods : on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. -- Credence goods ; experiment ; liability ; verifiability ; reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003814341
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Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply : an experimental investigation
Niederle, Muriel; Roth, Alvin E.; Ünver, Utku - In: Games 4 (2013) 2, pp. 243-282
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785461