This paper uses a cohort microsimulation model to analyse intragenerational distributional effects of a shift from a defined benefit pay‐as‐you‐go pension system that includes flat rate component and length of pensionable service component to a pension system with contribution based...

Disability Insurance (DI) programs have long been criticized by economists for apparent work disincentives. Some countries have recently modified their programs such that DI recipients are allowed to keep some of their benefits if they return to work, and other countries are considering similar...

We show how the age profile of earnings, retirement rules and retirement behavior are tightly linked through the general equilibrium of the economy. Generous Social Security benefits financed by large Social Security taxes discourage human capital accumulation. In Social Security systems where...

This paper explores the labor supply effects of a large-scale policy change in the Austrian disability insurance program, which tightened eligibility criteria for men above a certain age. Using administrative data on the universe of Austrian private-sector employees, the results of...

In most disability insurance programs beneficiaries lose some or all of their benefits if they earn above an earnings threshold. While intended to screen out applicants with high remaining working capacity, earnings limits can also distort the labor supply of beneficiaries. We develop a simple...

We study the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI) and derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) DI eligibility rules and (ii) DI benefits. Causal evidence from two DI reforms in Austria generate fiscal multipliers (total over mechanical cost...

Using Dutch administrative data, we assess the work and earnings capacity of disability insurance (DI) recipients by estimating employment and earnings responses to benefit cuts. Reassessment of DI entitlement under more stringent criteria removed 14.4 percent of recipients from the program and...

Most countries reduce Disability Insurance (DI) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability - a notch - and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in...

Between 2005 and 2020, Belgium experienced a significant rise in the recipiency rate of long-term disability insurance (DI), rising from 3.5% to 6.8%. In this paper, we examine the potential factors driving this increase by exploiting administrative micro-level data covering the Belgian...

Feldstein [1985] posed the questions of what would be the optimal level of retirement benefit, and what would be the optimal mix between the pay-as-you-go system and the funded pension system under the assumption of an exogenous interest rate. We reconsider the problem with the addition of a...