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Feedback and incentives : experimental evidence

Eriksson, Tor (contributor); Poulsen, Anders (contributor); … - 2008

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work. -- Performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003688788

Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments

Eriksson, Tor (contributor); Teyssier, Sabrina (contributor) - 2006

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003283430

Performance pay and within-firm wage inequality

Barth, Erling; Bratsberg, Bernt; Haegeland, Torbjørn; … - 2009

This paper examines the impact of performance-related pay on wage differentials within firms. Our theoretical framework predicts that, compared to a fixed pay system, pay schemes based on individual output increase within-firm wage inequality, while group-based bonuses have minor effects on wage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831899

Performance Pay and Within-Firm Wage Inequality

Barth, Erling - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013160306

The Peter Principle: An Experiment

Dickinson, David L.; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2007

The Peter Principle states that, after a promotion, the observed output of promotedemployees tends to fall. Lazear (2004) models this principle as resulting from a regression tothe mean of the transitory component of ability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008939753

Who pays for performance?

Barth, Erling; Bratsberg, Bernt; Haegeland, Torbjørn; … - 2006

Using Norwegian establishment surveys from 1997 and 2003, we show that performance-related pay is more prevalent in firms where workers of the main occupation have a high degree of autonomy in how to organize their work. This observation supports an interpretation of incentive pay as motivated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003328059

Effort and comparison income : experimental and survey evidence

Clark, Andrew E. (contributor); Masclet, David (contributor) - 2006

This paper considers the effect of status or relative income on work effort combining experimental evidence from a gift-exchange game with ISSP survey data. We find a consistent negative effect of others' incomes on individual effort in both datasets. The individual's rank in the income...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003333113

Who Pays for Performance?

Barth, Erling - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012731722

Lies and biased evaluation : a real-effort experiment

Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2011

This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers' performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009311502

Male and female competitive behavior : experimental evidence

Gupta, Nabanita Datta (contributor); … - 2005

Male and female choices differ in many economic situations, e.g., on the labor market. This paper considers whether such differences are driven by different attitudes towards competition. In our experiment subjects choose between a tournament and a piece-rate pay scheme before performing a real...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003280790