This article examines pollution and environmental mortality in an economy where fertility is endogenous and output is produced from labor and capital by two sectors, dirty and clean. An emission tax curbs dirty production, which decreases pollution-induced mortality but also shifts resources to...

This paper develops a micro-founded city systems model with an endogenous number of cities to explore whether local governments establish the optimal city size when production processes involve environmental pollution. Our analysis delivers two key insights. First, if an optimal scheme to...

This paper studies the impact of national carbon taxes on CO2 emissions. To do so, we run local projections on a cross-country panel dataset, matching measures of emissions of carbon dioxide with information on the introduction of carbon taxes and their implied price. Importantly, we consider...

We study the implications of climate change and the associated mitigation measures for optimal monetary policy in a canonical New Keynesian model with climate externalities. Provided they are set at their socially optimal level, carbon taxes pose no trade-offs for monetary policy: it is both...

The control of carbon emissions by policymakers poses the corporate challenge of developing an optimal carbon management policy. We provide a unified model that characterizes how firms should optimally manage emissions through production, green investment, and the trading of carbon credits. We...

In this paper, we assess the distributional impact of introducing a carbon tax in Poland. We apply a two-step simulation procedure. First, we evaluate the economy-wide effects with a dynamic general equilibrium model. Second, we use a microsimulation model based on household budget survey data...

Using a stacked differences-in-differences approach, we study the effects of Low Emission Zones (LEZs) in Germany. The implementation of stage 1 and 2 LEZs, which banned the most pollution-intensive vehicles from city centers, significantly reduced PM10 concentrations. The most restrictive third...

In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result...