Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that labor's interest may well – like that of shareholders – aim at … interest in increasing incentive-based compensation to avoid management's excessive risk taking and short-run oriented …

the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the …This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial … acquisition premium. At sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, managers value a reduction in the risk of their …

Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks … sufficiently resolve agency problems so that they can attract funding from outside shareholders and depositors. We examine banks … policies, risk, and methods of risk management. Formal corporate governance is lower when manager ownership shares are higher …

We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential …

-powered incentives in executive compensation contracts written by shareholders whose objective is to maximize the value of their shares …. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …

The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to … managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …