This paper investigates a dynamic general equilibrium model with search. In particular, search externalities are reßected by an increasing returns to scale matching function, which may imply an indeterminate equilibrium. Hence, the model is capable to generate business ßuctuations, driven by...

This paper develops a model with multiple steady states (low tax and unemployment rate versus high tax and unemployment rate) in which equilibrium selection is not conditioned on a sunspot variable. Instead, large enough shocks initiate unavoidable transitions from one regime to the other. The...

This paper analyzes the effect of labor and product market regulation in a dynamic stochastic equilibrium with search frictions. Modeling multiple-worker firms allows us to distinguish between the exit-and-entry (extensive) margin, and the hiring-and-firing (intensive) margin. We characterize...

In this paper, I introduce money in the standard labor-matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides 1999, Pissarides 2000). A double coincidence problem makes Fiat Money necessary as a medium of exchange. In the long-run, a rise in the rate of money growth leads to higher inflation and higher...

This paper presents a theory explaining the labor market matching process through microeconomic incentives. There are heterogeneous variations in the characteristics of workers and jobs, and firms face adjustment costs in responding to these variations. Matches and separations are described...

This paper reviews recent approaches to modeling the labour market and assesses their implications for in.ation dynamics through both their effect on marginal cost and on price-setting behaviour. In a search and matching environment, we consider the following modeling setups: right-to-manage...

This paper focuses on tenure driven productivity dynamics of a firm-worker match as a potential explanation of "unemployment volatility puzzle". We let new matches and continuing jobs differ by their productivity levels and by their sensitivity to aggregate productivity shocks. As a result, new...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise because workers typically do not know where other workers apply to and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider. The first coordination friction affects network formation, while the second...

A large part of the literature on frictional matching in the labor market assumes bilateral meetings between workers and firms. This ignores the frictions that arise when workers and firms meet in a multilateral way and cannot coordinate their application and hiring decisions. I analyze the...

Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs, as unprofitable workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, thus sparing their incumbent employer the firing costs. Furthermore, employers can induce their unprofitable workers to accept...