We propose a novel selectivity correction procedure to deal with survey attrition, at the crossroads of the "Heckit" and of the bounding approach of Lee (2009). As a substitute for the instrument needed in sample selectivity correction models, we use information on the number of attempts that...

The randomized trial literature has helped to renew the fields of microeconometric policy evaluation by emphasizing identification issues raised by endogenous program participation. Measurement and attrition issues have perhaps received less attention. This paper analyzes the dramatic impact of...

In this paper, we specify and estimate a structurally dependent competing risks model for the transitions out of unemployment into either new job or recall. The recall probability is allowed to affect the search intensity for new jobs.

This paper examines the determinants of unemployment duration in a competing risks framework with two destination states, namely, inactivity and employment. The major innovation is our recognition of defective risks. We first use a polynomial hazard function to test for the presence of...

This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in unemployment benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-unemployment employment...

We investigate whether women search longer for a job than men and whether these differences change over the life cycle. Our empirical analysis exploits German register data on highly attached displaced workers. We apply duration models to analyze gender differences in job search taking into...

Unlike other disability systems in developed economies, the Spanish system allows partially disabled individuals to work while receiving disability benefits. The puzzle is, however, that employment rates in this group of individuals are very low. The aim of this paper is to understand the...

This paper analyzes an urn-ball matching model in which workers decide how intensively they sample job openings and apply at a stochastic number of suitable vacancies. Equilibrium is not constrained efficient; entry is excessive and search intensity can be too high or too low. Moreover, an...

We study human capital accumulation in an environment of competitive search. Given that unemployed workers can default on their education loans, skilled individuals with a larger debt burden prefer riskier but better paid careers than is socially desirable. A higher level of employment risk in...

We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative...