In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

performance. Our results are consistent with a simple investment-cum-matching model: pairing the worst performing individuals with … the best yields 20% lower first stage effort than random matching. Pairing the best with the best, however, yields 5 …% higher first stage effort than random matching. In line with the theory the latter result is more pronounced when the task …

We argue that using wage data alone, it is virtually impossible to identify whether Assortative Matching between worker … and firm types is positive or negative. In standard competitive matching models the wages are determined by the marginal … sorting in the presence of search frictions independent of the sign of the sorting. -- Sorting ; assortative matching …