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Using data on executive compensation for the German chemical industry, we investigate the relevance of two theoretical approaches that focus on bonuses as part of a long term wage policy of a firm. The first approach argues that explicit bonuses serve as substitutes for implicit career concerns....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009155574
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show … that agents' strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a … agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335241
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221
recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We explain these empirical puzzles by combining job-promotion tournaments … recruitment ; job promotion ; limited liability ; tournaments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003755972
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002239140