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Third-party vs. second-party control : disentangling the role of autonomy and reciprocity

Burdín, Gabriel; Halliday, Simon D.; Landini, Fabio - 2015

This paper studies the role of autonomy and reciprocity in explaining control averse responses in principal-agents interactions. While most of the social psychology literature emphasizes the role of autonomy, recent economic research has provided an alternative explanation based on reciprocity....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011308435

Eliciting motives for trust and reciprocity by attitudinal and behavioural measures

Farina, Francesco (contributor); … - 2008

important primitives of social capital - trust and reciprocity - which can be used to explain deviations from the Nash … the behaviour of players in experimental trust and dictator games and suggest that the most informative utilization of … questionnaire about attitudes to trusting and reciprocating predict subjects' behaviour and, by comparing behaviour in Trust and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003735424

Facing yourself : a note on self-image

Falk, Armin - 2017

Numerous signaling models in economics assume image concerns. These take two forms, as relating either to social image or self-image. While empirical work has identified the behavioral importance of the former, little is known about the role of self-image concerns. We exogenously vary self-image...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011625349

Who benefits from corporate social responsibility? : reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection

Briscese, Guglielmo; Feltovich, Nick; Slonim, Robert - 2021

Firms can donate a share of profits to charity as a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Recent experiments have found that such initiatives can induce higher effort by workers, generating benefits for both sides of the labour market. We design a novel version of the gift-exchange game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012428322

Sabotage in tournaments : evidence from a laboratory experiment

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2009

Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory: effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003859419

Testing a forgotten aspect of Akerlof's gift exchange hypothesis : relational contracts with individual and uniform wages

Kocher, Martin; Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Sutter, Matthias - 2012

Empirical work on Akerlof's theory of gift exchange in labor markets has concentrated on the fair wage-effort hypothesis. In fact, however, the theory also contains a social component that stipulates that homogenous agents that are employed for the same wage level will exert more effort,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009533989

Are happier people less judgmental of other people's selfish behaviors? : laboratory evidence from trust and gift exchange games

Drouvelis, Michalis; Powdthavee, Nattavudh - 2013

What determines people's moral judgments of selfish behaviors? Here we study whether people's normative views in trust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771743

Econographics

Chapman, Jonathan; Dean, Mark; Ortoleva, Pietro; … - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011911886

More than the money : payoff-irrelevant terms in relational contracts

Goerg, Sebastian J.; Ziółkowska, Monika - 2018

We investigate how payoff-irrelevant terms can negatively impact relational contracts. In a lab experiment we compare two economically equivalent contracts - a fixed-term renewable and an open-ended at-will contract. Each contract provides partners with full flexibility regarding the length and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011893426

The sequencing of gift exchange : a field trial

Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2017

There is now an extensive literature on "gift exchange" showing that when principals and agents can trade "gifts" (rewards that should not emerge in a competitive equilibrium), exchange becomes more efficient. However, it is not obvious how gift exchange should be organized if the principal's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011647476