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Feedback and incentives : experimental evidence

Eriksson, Tor (contributor); Poulsen, Anders (contributor); … - 2008

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work. -- Performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003688788

Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments

Eriksson, Tor (contributor); Teyssier, Sabrina (contributor) - 2006

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003283430

Performance pay and within-firm wage inequality

Barth, Erling; Bratsberg, Bernt; Haegeland, Torbjørn; … - 2009

This paper examines the impact of performance-related pay on wage differentials within firms. Our theoretical framework predicts that, compared to a fixed pay system, pay schemes based on individual output increase within-firm wage inequality, while group-based bonuses have minor effects on wage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831899

Who pays for performance?

Barth, Erling; Bratsberg, Bernt; Haegeland, Torbjørn; … - 2006

Using Norwegian establishment surveys from 1997 and 2003, we show that performance-related pay is more prevalent in firms where workers of the main occupation have a high degree of autonomy in how to organize their work. This observation supports an interpretation of incentive pay as motivated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003328059

Effort and comparison income : experimental and survey evidence

Clark, Andrew E. (contributor); Masclet, David (contributor) - 2006

This paper considers the effect of status or relative income on work effort combining experimental evidence from a gift-exchange game with ISSP survey data. We find a consistent negative effect of others' incomes on individual effort in both datasets. The individual's rank in the income...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003333113

Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - 2013

Empirical studies of the principal-agent relationship find that extrinsic incentives work in many instances, linking rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal drive to work to master a skill or to improve one's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771729

Motivating agents : how much does the mission matter?

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Gong, Erick - 2013

Economic theory predicts that agents will work harder if they believe in the "mission" of the organization. Well-identified estimates of exactly how much harder they will work have been elusive, however, because agents select into jobs. We conduct a real effort experiment with participants who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010125806

Progressive taxation in a tournament economy

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans; Tabb, Benjamin - 2014

Not enough is known about the responsiveness of individuals, in particular those who tend to work under different incentives, to changes in marginal tax rates. We ask whether changes in marginal tax rates are less distortionary for workers engaged in a contest. To examine this potential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010394004

Performance pay and the erosion of worker cooperation : field experimental evidence

Burks, Stephen V. (contributor); … - 2006

We report the results of a field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003292055

Workplace democracy in the lab

Mellizo, Philip; Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans - 2011

While intuition suggests that empowering workers to have some say in the control of the firm is likely to have beneficial incentive effects, empirical evidence of such an effect is hard to come by because of numerous confounding factors in the naturally occurring data. We report evidence from a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009126031