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Feedback and incentives : experimental evidence

Eriksson, Tor (contributor); Poulsen, Anders (contributor); … - 2008

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work. -- Performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003688788

Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments

Eriksson, Tor (contributor); Teyssier, Sabrina (contributor) - 2006

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003283430

Piece work pay and hourly pay over the cycle

Hart, Robert A. (contributor) - 2006

This paper investigates the relative cyclical behavior of the pay of piece workers and hourly paid workers. It uses a unique data set of blue-collar workers in British engineering between 1926 and 1966. The statistics are obtained from the payrolls of firms belonging to the Engineering Employers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003411751

Real wages, working time, and the great depression : what does micro evidence tell us?

Hart, Robert A.; Roberts, J. Elizabeth - 2010

Based largely on industry-level aggregate statistics, the prevailing view, and one that has strongly influenced macroeconomic thought, is that real wages during the cycle containing the Great Depression are either acyclical or countercyclical. Does this finding hold-up when more micro data are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003969885

Piecework versus timework in British wartime engineering

Hart, Robert A. (contributor) - 2005

The British engineering industry experienced extreme production and employment pressures during the rearmament period that preceded the Second World War and in the early war years. Did it react by placing a greater emphasis on incentive-compatible payment methods? This paper examines the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002804914

Effort and comparison income : experimental and survey evidence

Clark, Andrew E. (contributor); Masclet, David (contributor) - 2006

This paper considers the effect of status or relative income on work effort combining experimental evidence from a gift-exchange game with ISSP survey data. We find a consistent negative effect of others' incomes on individual effort in both datasets. The individual's rank in the income...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003333113

Why do firms pay an overtime premium?

Hart, Robert A.; Ma, Yue - 2000

wage-hours contracts within the framework of a two-period specific human capital model with asymmetric information. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335237

Wages, hours and human capital over the life cycle

Hart, Robert A.; Ma, Yue - 2000

We investigate wage-hours contracts within a four-period rent sharing model that incorporates asymmetric information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325980

Paid and unpaid overtime working in Germany and the UK

Bell, David N. F.; Hart, Robert A.; Hübler, Olaf; … - 2000

Significant numbers of employees work more hours in the workplace than their contract stipulates. Such overtime work can either be paid or unpaid. This research considers overtime working in Germany and the UK and shows that the quantitative significance of both paid and unpaid overtime is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325986

Overtime working and contract efficiency

Hart, Robert A.; Ma, Yue - 2013

combined with firm and worker information asymmetries. It may be optimal for the parties to work 'long hours' remunerated at …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009788790