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. Our results are consistent with the theory of strategic ambiguity of Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and can be rationalized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003609846
We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402873
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002115504
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001784299
Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009308812
We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765609
This paper shows that the incentive effects of heterogeneity may be positive rather than negative in dynamic contests with multiple stages. In particular, the well-studied adverse effects of heterogeneity in static interactions are compensated by positive continuation-value and selection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010394022
hypothesized and examined in theory and experiments, the literature is largely silent on the comparison. I report the results of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011647476
To test and replicate the superstar effect reported by Brown (2011) we empirically study contests where a single entrant has an endogenously higher probability of winning. Unlike the previous literature, we test for the presence of the superstar effect in several different contexts. Ultimately,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011647661
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221