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Saint-Paul, Gilles - 2018

Economists recommend to partly redistribute gains to losers from a structural reform, which in many cases may be required for making the reform politically viable. However, taxation is distortionary. Then, it is unclear that compensatory transfers can support a Pareto-improving reform. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011951457

Switching queues, cultural conventions, and social welfare

Stark, Oded; Budziński, Wiktor; Kosiorowski, Grzegorz - 2019

We use queuing-related behavior as an instrument for assessing the social appeal of alternative cultural norms. Specifically, we study the behavior of rational and sophisticated individuals who stand in a given queue waiting to be served, and who, in order to speed up the process, consider...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012019242

Household consumption when the marriage is stable

Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; Rock, Bram de; … - 2014

We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption patterns. We start by defining a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable. In particular, stability means that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337411

Reciprocal climate negotiators

Nyborg, Karine - 2015

on others' abatement. I show that a full or majority coalition can be stable. This requires, however, that a majority of … countries have relatively strong reciprocity preferences. No coalition participation is always stable. In addition, a stable … minority coalition may exist; if so, it is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010488278

Voting power and survival : the case of a ruling party

Jelnov, Artyom; Jelnov, Pavel - 2019

In this article, we empirically study the survival of the ruling party in parliamentary democracies using a hazard rate model. We define survival of a crisis as being successful in a critical vote in the parliament. We develop a general probabilistic model of political crises and test it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012019199

Money illusion and coordination failure

Fehr, Ernst (contributor); Tyran, Jean-Robert (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001908046

Individual responsibility and the funding of collective goods

Lévy-Garboua, Louis (contributor); … - 2007

When a deficit occurs in the funding of collective goods, it is usually covered by raising the amount of taxes or by rationing the supply of the goods. This article compares the efficiency of these institutions. We report the results of a 2x2 experiment based on a game in the first stage of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003561619

Splitting Tournaments

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Klaauw, Bas van der - 2010

In this paper we investigate how heterogeneous agents choose among tournaments with different prizes. We show that if the number of agents is sufficiently small, multiple equilibria can arise. Depending on how the prize money is split over the tournaments, these may include, for example, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009007838

Selfish altruism, fierce cooperation and the emergence of cooperative equilibria from passing and shooting

Askitas, Nikos - 2014

There is continuing debate about what explains cooperation and self-sacrifice in nature and in particular in humans. This paper suggests a new way to think about this famous problem. I argue that, for an evolutionary biologist as well as a quantitative social scientist, the triangle of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010235846

Experimental games on networks : underpinnings of behavior and equilibrium selection

Charness, Gary; Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, … - 2014

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344833