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We introduce dynamic incentive contracts into a model of unemployment dynamics and present three results. First, wage … cyclicality from incentives does not dampen unemployment dynamics: the response of unemployment to shocks is first … cyclicality from bargaining dampens unemployment dynamics through the standard mechanism. Third, our calibrated model suggests 46 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014390530
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003561637
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009729417
We model the sorting of medical students across medical occupations and identify a mechanism that explains the possibility of differential productivity across occupations. The model combines moral hazard and matching of physicians and occupations with pre-matching investments. In equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782448
What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-agent model where control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003539334
We study the impact of monitoring in a workplace context where both firms and employees are unable to perfectly observe the individual worker contribution to total output. Therefore, in our setting monitoring is not aimed at reducing information asymmetries but still affects effort and output....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014534559
Severance pay, a fixed-sum payment to workers at job separation, has been the focus of intense policy concern for the last several decades, but much of this concern is unearned. The design of the ideal separation package is outlined and severance pay emerges as a natural component of job...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195446
The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a … productivity of unemployed is constant over the unemployment spell, benefits should typically increase or be constant. The only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414504
Using German establishment data, we show that the relationship between intensity of performance pay and intensity of applicant screening depends on the nature of production. In establishments with increased multitasking, performance pay is positively associated with applicant screening. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011631541