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Attorneys elected to the US Congress and to US state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation, but more likely to support bills that extend tort law than legislators with a different professional background. This finding is based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010488138
Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212997
Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the … literature on vote-buying is the legislative lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that … additional treatments with simultaneous moves. We find that lobbies buy supermajorities as predicted by the theory. Our results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012035706
Business and politician interaction is pervasive but has mostly been analysed with a binary approach. Yet the network dimensions of such connections are ubiquitous. We use a unique dataset for seven economies that documents politically exposed persons (PEPs) and their links to companies,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011853617
The social costs of rent seeking are generally evaluated with respect to rent dissipation. A common assumption is complete rent dissipation so that the value of a contested rent is the value of social loss. When rent seekers earn taxable income, there is interdependence between the social cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350827
This paper investigates the interaction between establishment-level codetermination and industry-level collective bargaining in Germany. Based on a simple bargaining model we derive our main hypothesis: In establishments covered by collective bargaining agreements works councils are more likely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402748
In this paper, we present a simple model in which a unionized and non-unionized firm optimally make investment decisions given their labor productivity. By allowing workers' organizations to have positive effects on labor effort, we find that the classic hold-up problem does not necessarily...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012058483
Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively underdexplored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment is affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011964890
Economists recommend to partly redistribute gains to losers from a structural reform, which in many cases may be required for making the reform politically viable. However, taxation is distortionary. Then, it is unclear that compensatory transfers can support a Pareto-improving reform. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011951457
Can a society suffering contests between rich and poor achieve good governance in the face of endemic corruption? We examine a stylized poor state with weak institutions in which a "culture of evasion" damages state authority. Many evade tax payments, limiting the state's economic development...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762214