tradeoff between risk and incentives. Subjects in our experiments choose their compensation for performing a real-effort task …) the reference point in a risk-free environment behave risk averse (seeking) in risky environments. In a second experiment …We conduct laboratory experiments to investigate basic predictions of principal-agent theory about the choice of piece …

research (Davies & Fafchamps, 2017) has shown that managers in Ghana are reluctant to use monetary incentives to motivate … workers. This paper presents the results from a gift-exchange game experiment in Ghana in which the worker can make a promise … can help sustain cooperate behaviour (high effort provision), but only if the wage offered is high enough. Feedback …

Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many … crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after incentives have been abolished. This crowding out occurs also in repeated …-effort relationships. Our systematic analysis also replicates established results on gift exchange, incentives, and crowding out of …

crowding out due to low-powered incentives. High-powered incentives in the workplace tend to increase output, but it is unknown … also extends to high-powered incentives, in a real work setting with paid workers. There is individual heterogeneity …

An investor's choice between safe and risky assets has long been seen as a behavior toward risk: more risk …-averse investors buy more of the safe asset. Applying this intuition to incentive pay contracts, we develop a model and an experiment … that show, in a very general setting, that the choice between work effort and leisure under given linear incentives depends …

intent, that can cause incentives to fail. Using an experiment that provides the material circumstances necessary for …Empirical studies of the principal-agent relationship find that extrinsic incentives work in many instances, linking … drive to work to master a skill or to improve one's self image, is thought to be the key to whether incentives work or not …

the theoretical benchmark with behavior observed in a one-shot experiment. …

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in … level that prevails in the absence of any feedback. Thus, both no feedback and truthful feedback are better for incentives …

contractual incompleteness. In our experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. The principal pays equal wages in one …. This is not caused by monetary incentives per se since under both wage schemes it is profit-maximizing for agents to exert …