Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 2,230
Cover Image
"Buy-It-Now" or "Sell-It-Now" auctions : effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms
Grebe, Tim; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2015
at a fixed price before an auction. In the "Buy-It-Now" format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011407823
Cover Image
Transparency, inequity aversion, and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams : theory and evidence
Mohnen, Alwine (contributor); Pokorny, Kathrin (contributor) - 2008
We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003652683
Cover Image
Rational inattention and employer learning
Habermalz, Steffen - 2010
learning model with the theory of rational inattention introduced by Sims (2006). In the model firms optimally allocate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009300804
Cover Image
He said, she said : who gets believed when spreading (mis)information
Khan, Nuzaina; Rand, David; Shurchkov, Olga - 2024
We design an online experiment that mimics a Twitter/X "feed" to test whether (perceived) poster gender influences users' propensity to doubt the veracity of a given post. On average, posts by women are less likely to be flagged as concerning than identical posts by men. Heterogeneity analysis...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015062028
Cover Image
Price and saliency in health care: when can targeted nudges change behaviors?
Walker, Brigham - 2020
This paper takes advantage of a natural experiment to examine the relationship between the price and saliency of health …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012314696
Cover Image
Job search with bidder memories
Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos; Menzio, Guido; Smith, Eric - 2009
This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003879353
Cover Image
Political culture and discrimination in contests
Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2010
Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009007019
Cover Image
Competing with asking prices
Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2013
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to … asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives no better offers. Despite their prevalence in a … environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that using an asking price is optimal: it is the pricing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009696885
Cover Image
Lotteries vs. all-pay auctions in fair and biased contests
Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2012
The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This paper establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock-type endogenously determined lottery is always superior to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009675128
Cover Image
Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2016
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011476548