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Physician payment contracts in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection : the theory and its application to Ontario

Kantarevic, Jasmin; Kralj, Boris - 2015

We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include: (1) physicians...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288527

Should UI benefits really fall over time?

Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente - 2002

The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414504

Bonus culture : competitive pay, screening, and multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - 2013

away from less easily contractible tasks such as long-term investments, risk management and within-firm cooperation. Under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009729417

An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance

Hagedorn, Marcus (contributor); Kaul, Ashok (contributor); … - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001743999

Optimal social insurance and rising labor market risk

Krebs, Tom; Scheffel, Martin - 2019

This paper analyzes the optimal response of the social insurance system to a rise in labor market risk. To this end, we … develop a tractable macroeconomic model with risk-free physical capital, risky human capital (labor market risk) and … (human capital) risk increases social welfare if the government adjusts the tax-and-transfer system optimally. Finally, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011977744

Long-run consequences of health insurance promotion : evidence from a field experiment in Ghana

Asuming, Patrick Opoku; Kim, Hyuncheol Bryant; Sim, Armand - 2017

We study the long-run impacts of health insurance promotion in Northern Ghana. We randomly provide three overlapping interventions to promote enrollment: subsidy, information campaign, and convenient sign-up option, with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757745

A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care

Bolhaar, Jonneke (contributor); … - 2008

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003755954

Understanding severance pay

Parsons, Donald O. - 2013

Severance pay, a fixed-sum payment to workers at job separation, has been the focus of intense policy concern for the last several decades, but much of this concern is unearned. The design of the ideal separation package is outlined and severance pay emerges as a natural component of job...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195446

The simple analytics of job displacement insurance

Parsons, Donald O. - 2016

and in combination, introduce potentially serious contracting concerns. Economic theory provides a practical guide to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455569

Moral-hazard-free first-best unemployment insurance

Parsons, Donald O. - 2016

Unemployment insurance replacement rates world-wide are well below 100 percent, a fact often attributed to search moral hazard concerns. As Blanchard and Tirole (2008) have illustrated, however, neither search nor layoff moral hazard (firing cost) distortions need arise in first-best insurance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455570

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