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Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics, and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort
Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2006
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003323166
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How do labor representatives affect incentive orientation of executive compensation?
Dyballa, Katharina; Kraft, Kornelius - 2016
interest in increasing incentive-based compensation to avoid management's excessive risk taking and short-run oriented …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526742
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An experimental test of career concerns
Koch, Alexander K. (contributor);  … - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision makers'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002501830
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Output-based pay: incentives, retention or sorting?
Lazear, Edward P. (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001750022
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Principals as agents? : Investigating accountability in the compensation and performance of school principals
Billger, Sherrilyn M. (contributor) - 2007
In this study I examine the relationship between accountability (e.g., state sanctions for poor performance, or the presence of goals required by the district) and public secondary principal pay and school performance. Though such incentives and standards are increasingly common, the existing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003539237
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Bonus payments and reference point violations
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2010
We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003941775
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Executive compensation and competition in the banking and financial sectors
Cuñat, Vicente (contributor); Guadalupe, Maria (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002035589
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Information provision, incentives, and attention: a field experiment on facilitating and influencing managers' decisions
Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk; Vogelsang, Timo - 2021
The core role of managerial accounting is to provide information to facilitate managers' decisions and influence their … experiment in a large retail chain. In a 2 × 2 factorial design, we vary: (i) whether store managers obtain access to decision … different behavioral channels. In particular, managers make use of the information provided by placing higher-margin products …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012487017
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Performance pay and applicant screening
Jirjahn, Uwe; Mohrenweiser, Jens - 2017
Using German establishment data, we show that the relationship between intensity of performance pay and intensity of applicant screening depends on the nature of production. In establishments with increased multitasking, performance pay is positively associated with applicant screening. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011631541
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Performance pay, group selection and group performance
Königstein, Manfred (contributor);  … - 2007
Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may, first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose work effort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for both tasks as offered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003577782