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Bonus culture : competitive pay, screening, and multitasking
Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - 2013
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009729417
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Dynamic contracts and learning by doing
Prat, Julien - 2014
This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010246654
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Physician payment contracts in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection : the theory and its application to Ontario
Kantarevic, Jasmin; Kralj, Boris - 2015
We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include: (1) physicians...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288527
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Hidden action, identification, and organization design
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2010
. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any … moral hazard models yields insights into optimal organization design, uncovers the reason why certain organization designs …-tasking problem. -- moral hazard ; hidden action ; implementation ; multi-tasking ; identification by organization design …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009303451
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Hidden insurance in a moral hazard economy
Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - 2013
We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225898
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Division of labour and directed production
Ratto, Marisa (contributor); Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2005
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003011512
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The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403219
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The hold-down problem and the boundaries of the firm : lessons from a hidden action model with endogenous outside option
Schnedler, Wendelin; Sunde, Uwe - 2002
This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410683
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Should UI benefits really fall over time?
Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente - 2002
The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414504
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Long-run consequences of health insurance promotion : evidence from a field experiment in Ghana
Asuming, Patrick Opoku; Kim, Hyuncheol Bryant; Sim, Armand - 2017
We study the long-run impacts of health insurance promotion in Northern Ghana. We randomly provide three overlapping interventions to promote enrollment: subsidy, information campaign, and convenient sign-up option, with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757745