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The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398756
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510004
When investing in research and development (R&D), institutions must decide whether to take a top-down approach - soliciting a particular technology - or a bottom-up approach in which innovators suggest ideas. This paper examines a reform to the U.S. Air Force Small Business Innovation Research...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012517156
government procurement contracts from smaller to larger firms. Consequently, industries become more concentrated and growth …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014580134
power of landowner relationship networks and lobbying behaviour on successfully gaining value-enhancing rezoning. A State …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516454
Recent studies indicate that firms often outsource standard and simple tasks, while keeping complex and important inputs inside their boundaries. This observation is difficult to reconcile with the property rights approach of the firm, which suggests that important components should be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009539235
corruption, weaker property rights and especially intellectual property rights, and a larger state on entrepreneurs who plan to … property rights. -- entrepreneurship ; institutions ; corruption ; property rights ; government ; Global Entrepreneurship …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009152794
Conventional wisdom depicts corruption as a tax on incumbent firms. This paper challenges this view in two ways. First …, by arguing that corruption matters not so much because of the value of the bribe ("tax"), but because of another less … studied feature of corruption, namely bribe unavoidability. Second, we argue that the social costs of corruption arise not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153607
corruption in every sector is remarkably high. Stifling bureaucratic interference and corruption at every stage of economic … governance allowing substantial corruption in the system. Based on a study of 20 Indian states, we empirically show that higher … corruption increases level of employment in the informal sector. Further, our analysis also shows that for higher levels of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009234509
Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature … associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one … suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003755929