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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives

Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024

We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493793

When incentives backfire : spillover effects in food choice

Angelucci, Manuela; Prina, Silvia; Royer, Heather; … - 2015

How do peers influence the impact of incentives? Despite much work on incentives, little is known about the spillover … effects of incentives. We investigate two mechanisms by which these effects can occur: through peers' actions and peers …' incentives. In a field experiment on snack choice (grapes versus cookies), we randomize who receives incentives, the fraction of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011308981

Cooperation, punishment and organized crime : a lab-in-the-field experiment in Southern Italy

Nese, Annamaria; O'Higgins, Shane Niall; Sbriglia, Patrizia - 2016

This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which allows a deeper insight into the nature of social preferences amongst organized criminals and how these differ from "ordinary" criminals on the one hand and from the non‐criminal population in the same geographical area on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011458326

Discrimination as favoritism : the private benefits and social costs of in-group favoritism in an experimental labor market

Dickinson, David L.; Masclet, David; Peterlé, Emmanuel - 2017

In this paper, we examine labor market favoritism in a unique laboratory experiment design that can shed light on both the private benefits and spillover costs of employer favoritism (or discrimination). Group identity is induced on subjects such that each laboratory "society"consists of eight...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621487

Mutual monitoring in teams : theory and experimental evidence on the importance of reciprocity

Carpenter, Jeffrey P. (contributor); … - 2006

Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003314674

Team governance : empowerment or hierarchical control

Friebel, Guido (contributor); … - 2007

, the more likely it is that teams are empowered. -- Team work ; incentives ; informed principal ; intrinsic motivation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003578893

Legitimacy of control

Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor); … - 2007

What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-agent model where control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003539334

First-place loving and last-place loathing : how rank in the distribution of performance affects effort provision

Gill, David; Kissová, Zdenka; Lee, Jaesun; Prowse, … - 2015

structures and incentives schemes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011308986

Paid to perform? : compensation profiles under pure wage and performance related pay arrangements

Sessions, John G.; Skåtun, John Douglas F. - 2011

Whilst existing efficiency wage literature assumes detection probabilities of shirkers are exogenous, this paper finds them positively and endogenously dependent on non-shirkers' effort. It shares the result with the endogenous monitoring models where, in some regions, workers reduce effort in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009235551

Competition and relational contracts : the role of unemployment as a disciplinary device

Brown, Martin (contributor); Falk, Armin (contributor); … - 2008

When unemployment prevails, relations with a particular firm are valuable for workers. As a consequence, a worker may adhere to an implicit agreement to provide high effort, even when performance is not third-party enforceable. But can implicit agreements - or relational contracts - also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003656931

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