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Disclosure, trust and persuasion in insurance markets

De Meza, David E.; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Reyniers, Diane J. - 2010

This high-stakes experiment investigates the effect on buyers of mandatory disclosures concerning an insurance policy … trusting plays an important role. Trust is clearly associated with greater willingness to pay for insurance. Unlike in previous … of breach is negligible. However, as for much B2C insurance marketing, face-to-face selling plays a crucial role in our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688915

Relative performance pay, bonuses, and job-promotion tournaments

Kräkel, Matthias (contributor); … - 2008

Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable pay variation within hierarchy levels, (2) promotion premiums only in part explain hierarchical wage differences and (3) external recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003755972

Tournaments and managerial incentives in China's listed firms : new evidence

Kato, Takao (contributor); Long, Cheryl (contributor) - 2008

The promotion tournament as a potentially important incentive mechanism for top management in transition economies has not been examined by the emerging literature on managerial incentives in transition economies. This paper is the first attempt to fill this important gap in the literature. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003759900

Promotions and incentives : the case of multi-stage elimination tournaments

Altmann, Steffen (contributor); Falk, Armin (contributor); … - 2008

Promotion tournaments play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms. In this paper, we extend research on single-stage rank-order tournaments and analyze behavior in multi-stage elimination tournaments. The main treatment of our laboratory experiment is a two-stage tournament...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003777950

Incentives vs. selection in promotion tournaments : can a designer kill two birds with one stone?

Höchtl, Wolfgang; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Stracke, Rudi; … - 2011

This paper studies the performance of promotion tournaments with heterogeneous participants in two dimensions: incentive provision and selection. Our theoretical analysis reveals a trade-off for the tournament designer between the two goals: While total effort is maximized if less heterogeneous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009308037

Teams or tournaments? : a field experiment on cooperation and competition among university students

Bigoni, Maria; Fort, Margherita; Nardotto, Mattia; … - 2011

This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students' effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009310963

The adverse consequences of tournaments : evidence from a field experiment

De Paola, Maria; Gioia, Francesca; Scoppa, Vincenzo - 2016

We run a field experiment to investigate whether competing in rank-order tournaments with different prize spreads affects individual performance. Our experiment involved students from an Italian University who took an intermediate exam in which one part was awarded on the basis of their relative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455813

Psychological incentives, financial incentives, and risk attitudes in tournaments : an artefactual field experiment

Cadsby, Bram; Engle-Warnick, Jim; Fang, Tony; Song, Fei - 2015

Tournaments are widely used to assign bonuses and determine promotions because of the link between relative performance and rewards. However, performing relatively well (poorly) may also yield psychological benefits (pain). This may also stimulate effort. Through a real-effort artefactual field...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011407820

How many winners are good to have? : On tournaments with sabotage

Harbring, Christine (contributor); … - 2005

From an employer's perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones. We experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that within a reasonable framework productive and destructive activities are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003248842

After the tournament: outcomes and effort provision

McGee, Andrew D.; McGee, Peter - 2013

Modeling the incentive effects of competitions among employees for promotions or financial rewards, economists have largely ignored the effects of competition on effort provision once the competition is finished. In a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition outcomes affect the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221555

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