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Self-serving use of equity rules in bargaining with asymmetric outside options
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer … - 2013
We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191262
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Gift exchange and workers' fairness concerns : when equality is unfair
Abeler, Johannes; Altmann, Steffen; Kube, Sebastian; … - 2009
particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003863658
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510004
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Treating equals unequally : incentives in teams, workers' motivation and production technology
Goerg, Sebastian; Kube, Sebastian; Zultan, Ro'i - 2009
The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003800929
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Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
Englmaier, Florian (contributor); Wambach, Achim (contributor) - 2005
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003011503
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When fairness matters : cross-race responses to intentionally fair treatment
Harvey, Matthew; Nickerson, David W.; Wozniak, Abigail K. - 2023
Do White and Black Americans differ in their response to fair versus unfair treatment, and do these reactions depend on whether treatment is intentional? We study an ultimatum game in which we non-deceptively vary three dimensions: racial identities of participants, offer inequality, and whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014423753
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Relational contracts and the economic well-being of nations
Kukharskyy, Bohdan; Pflüger, Michael - 2010
Informal long-term relationships and mutual confidence play a crucial role in modern economies in at least two dimensions. First, the performance of firms is strongly affected by their capacity to solve organizational questions effectively and this capacity is apparently strongly related to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009314275
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The hold-down problem and the boundaries of the firm : lessons from a hidden action model with endogenous outside option
Schnedler, Wendelin; Sunde, Uwe - 2002
This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410683
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Moral hypocrisy, power and social preferences
Rustichini, Aldo; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2012
the fairness and unfairness of allocations in three different scenarios (a Dictator game, an Ultimatum game, and a Trust … same session we elicit again their principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in the same three … norm in its favor and the weak side agrees: Stated fairness is a compromise with power. Second, in most situations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009545257
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Reciprocal climate negotiators
Nyborg, Karine - 2015
International climate negotiations have been troubled by mutual mistrust. At the same time, a hope seems to prevail …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010488278