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Sanctions for young welfare recipients
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Uhlendorff, Arne; Wolff, Joachim - 2013
Social welfare systems usually imply specific obligations for benefit recipients. If a recipient does not comply with these obligations, a sanction involving a punitive benefits reduction may be imposed. In this paper we give an overview of the literature on the effects of sanctions in social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010194760
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The consequences of a piece rate on quantity and quality : evidence from a field experiment
Heywood, John S.; Siebert, William S.; Wei, Xiangdong - 2013
workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases … quantity, and we find that the resultant quality can be improved with sufficient monitoring. "Committed" workers also produce … results thus show how a firm can refine its worker selection and monitoring options together with the payment system to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010196479
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Pay for locally monitored performance? : a welfare analysis for teacher attendance in Ugandan primary schools
Cilliers, Jacobus; Kasirye, Ibrahim; Leaver, Clare; … - 2016
unincentivized local monitoring. We use these experimental impacts to undertake a detailed cost-benefit analysis and conclude, even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011520974
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Shirking, standards and the probability of detection
Sessions, John G.; Skåtun, John Douglas F. - 2015
By relaxing the common efficiency wage assumption of exogenous shirking detection probabilities, we demonstrate how standards and efficiency wages are related. In a more general setting where the probability of detection depends upon the equilibrium effort level of non-shirkers, we show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010488287
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
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The effect of benefit sanctions on the duration of unemployment
Lalive, Rafael; Ours, Jan C. van; Zweimüller, Josef - 2002
This paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labor market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410900
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Mandatory integration agreements for unemployed job seekers: a randomized controlled field experiment in Germany
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Stephan, Gesine - 2021
In the German unemployment insurance system, Integration Agreements (IA) are mandatory contracts between the employment agency and the unemployed, jointly signed by the latter and the caseworker. IAs stipulate rights and obligations but are generally perceived as instruments to control search...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415082
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Imperfect monitoring of job search : structural estimation and policy design
Cockx, Bart; Dejemeppe, Muriel; Launov, Andrey; Van der … - 2017
typical job search monitoring scheme in unemployment insurance (UI) and acknowledges that search effort and requirements are … measured imperfectly. Based on Belgian data, monitoring is found to affect search behavior only weakly, because (i) assessments … were scheduled late and infrequently; (ii) the monitoring technology was not sufficiently precise, (iii) lenient Belgian UI …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607249
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Talking about performance or paying for it? : evidence from a field experiment
Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk; Vogelsang, Timo - 2019
We investigate the causal effect of conversations about performance and performance pay implementing a 2x2 field experiment in a retail chain. In the performance pay treatments, managers receive a bonus for profit increases. In the performance review treatments, managers have regular meetings...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012027597
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Negotiating cooperation under uncertainty : communication in noisy, indefinitely repeated interactions
Dvorak, Fabian; Fehrler, Sebastian - 2018
understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring and communication structures in the laboratory. Under all monitoring … monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise, cooperation is stable only when subjects can communicate before every …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925584