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Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents - an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831629
In this paper, we present a directed search model of the housing market. The pricing mechanism we analyze reflects the way houses are bought and sold in the United States. Our model is consistent with the observation that houses are sometimes sold above, sometimes below and sometimes at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003932400
Teamwork and cooperation between workers can be of substantial value to a firm, yet the level of worker cooperation often varies between individual firms. We show that these differences can be the result of labor market competition if workers have heterogeneous preferences and preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003603601
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510004
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011476548
This paper studies how an institution such as markets affects the evolution of mankind. My key point is that the forces of natural selection are made weaker because trade allows people to specialize in those activities where they are strong, and to offset their weaknesses by purchasing adequate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414433
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001800150
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003814341
In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013448173
We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterized by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003750306