requires reasonably accurate public information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production … willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group … reciprocity in teams. -- team production ; public good ; monitoring ; punishment ; experiment …

, typically at 10 to 16% per 100 days in a team; (iv) while initially teams lead to more downtime, these costs diminish over time …; (v) the performance-enhancing effects of team membership are generally greater and more long-lasting for team members who … are solicited by management; (vi) similar relationships exist for more educated team members. These findings square with …

team work if their co-workers do the same. We show that there is no pooling in equilibrium, and that workers self …-select into firms that differ in their incentives as well as their resulting level of team work. Our model can explain why firms …

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We … show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members … identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks …

performance of his peers, but decreases with the quality of the team's pitching. Furthermore, a pitcher's performance increases … with the pitching quality of his teammates, but is unaffected by the batting output of the team. These results are … effects ; team production ; externalities …